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Consult, Consent and Veto: International Norms and Canadian Treaties 
 
Shin Imai 
1
 
January 22, 2016 
 
 
 
In 2007, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People   validated the 
necessity of obtaining free, prior and informed consent before instituting significant extractive 
industry projects on Indigenous lands. The most surprising development since the Declaration’s 
adoption is the take-up of the standard by non-State private sector actors. International 
institutions such as the World Bank, the financial institutions belonging to the Equator Principles 
and the International Council on Mining and Metals have published policies accepting the 
necessity of obtaining free, prior, informed consent. In Canada, private sector actors have also 
recognized the consent standard, including the Prospector and Developers’ Association of 
Canada and a grouping of industry, financial institutions and First Nation organizations called 
the Boreal Forest Initiative. Obviously, adopting some version of the consent standard makes 
practical and financial sense to the industry. 
 
The courts in Canada have dealt with extractive projects on traditional Indigenous land using a 
different framework. Rather than requiring consent, Canadian courts require the Crown to 
consult and accommodate the interests of Indigenous groups.  Where treaty rights or Aboriginal 
rights are infringed, the courts require the Crown to justify the infringement through a test 
developed in R. v. Sparrow, which will be described in Part II.  Judges have said repeatedly that 
Indigenous groups in Canada do not have a “veto” over development. 
 
In this chapter I will look at the international consent standard with a view to developing a 
conceptual framework for its adoption in interpreting the “numbered treaties”.  There are eleven 
such treaties that were signed between 1871 and 1929. They cover a great deal of our country, 
spanning First Nation territories from Ontario to parts of British Columbia and north to the 
Northwest Territories. These treaties provide for the creation of small reserves for the Indians, 
and the “surrender” of the remaining tracts of land to the Crown. The land that is “surrendered” 
continues to be available for Indigenous hunting, fishing and harvesting activities. However, 
once the land is “taken up” by the provincial Crown for activities such as mining, lumbering and 
                                                 
1
  Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School and a co-founder of the Justice and Corporate Accountability 
Project. I would like to thank Sally Kang for research assistance and Kent McNeil and Jesse McCormick for making 
suggestions on the text. 
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settlement, the treaty rights to hunt, fish and harvest are suppressed. I will argue that the 
provincial Crown does not have a unilateral right to “take up” lands: rather, the Crown should 
obtain the consent of the First Nations concerned before authorizing extractive activity on 
traditional territories. 
 
In the argument that follows, I refer to documents created at the international level. However, I 
do not use these in the same way as my colleague Sara Seck. In her chapter, she places these 
instruments in a transnational governance context, and looks at the treaties between First Nations 
and the Crown in the international sphere. By contrast, I am looking at how to use these 
international standards in courts in Canada to benchmark Crown and private company conduct in 
relation to the use of traditional Indigenous territory. My argument is not that the international 
instruments are binding or persuasive qua international law, but rather that they are evidence of 
best practices in industry that should be incorporated into the development of the common law 
here. Sara Seck’s approach and my approach are different, but complementary. 
 
I. Consent and Treaties 
 
The Crown entered into the numbered treaties with Indigenous peoples in order to ensure peace 
and good-will with settlers who wished to enter the “tract of country” inhabited by the Indians.  
The treaties clearly state that the objective was “to obtain consent” of the Indians.2  The 
necessary implication is that the Crown recognized that there as an Indigenous party to the treaty 
that could, through internal deliberations, decide to give – or withhold – consent.  The legal 
framework at the time, then, was that there was an Indigenous collectivity, that it had an interest 
in the land and that consent of that collectivity was necessary in order to access their territory.
 3
 
 
Unfortunately, as the treaties were being rolled between 1871 and 1929, Canada entered into a 
century-long Dark Ages in relations with Indigenous peoples. Through the policy of assimilation, 
legislation was drafted that legalized the theft of regalia, the destruction of totem poles, the 
forbidding of ceremonies, the taking of children to residential schools and the appropriation of 
Indigenous lands. During this period, the legal framework for treaties and its foundation on 
consent were ignored. The prevailing attitude was articulated in 1929 by a judge in Nova Scotia 
who found that a 1752 treaty between the British and the Mi’kmaq was not enforceable. 
 
A civilized nation first discovering a country of uncivilized people or savages held such 
country as its own until such time as by treaty it was transferred to some other civilized 
nation. The savages' rights of sovereignty even of ownership were never recognized. 
Nova Scotia had passed to Great Britain not by gift or purchase from or even by conquest 
                                                 
2
 Treaty No. 9, online: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028863/1100100028864#chp5 
3
 I am implying that the legal framework corresponded to the actual practice on the ground. For a general discussion 
of problems with treaty implementation, see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: 
Looking Forward, Looking Back (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996), 176-179. 
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of the Indians but by treaty with France, which had acquired it by priority of discovery 
and ancient possession; and the Indians passed with it. 
4
 
 
So instead of Indigenous nations capable of making treaties, there was a new legal framework 
based on “savages” who were not capable of land ownership and therefore had nothing to give 
consent to. It is based on this legal framework that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau released his 
“White Paper” on Indian Policy in 1969. 5 He proposed to convert reserves into private property 
and get rid of Indian status, thereby removing legal space for Indigenous collectivities. 
 
II. Consultation, Accommodation and Veto 
 
A powerful blowback from First Nations against the White Paper policy, and a Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in 1973 that opened the possibility of Aboriginal title,
6
 started to roll back this 
policy of legal annihilation. Judicial recognition of Indigenous peoples was propelled by the 
enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act. 1982. 
 
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby 
recognized and affirmed.
7
 
 
In 1985 the Supreme Court of Canada said that Canada should honour the promises made by the 
Crown in the written versions of the treaties,
8
 then went further in 1999 to reinterpret the written 
versions of a treaty to take into account Indigenous perspectives.
9
  In 2005, the Supreme Court of 
Canada turned its attention to the interpretation of one of the most important clauses in the 
numbered treaties, and the clause that is central to the argument in this chapter. 
 
And Her Majesty the Queen HEREBY AGREES with the said Indians that they shall 
have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the 
tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such regulations as may from time to 
time be made by the Government of the country, acting under the authority of Her 
Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from time 
to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.
10
 
 
                                                 
4
 R. v. Syliboy, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 (N.S. Co. Ct.). 
5
 Canada, Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy (1969), online: http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/inac-ainc/indian_policy-e/cp1969_e.pdf (accessed December 20, 2014). 
6
 Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
7
 Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 c. 11. 
8
 R. v. Simon, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387.  
9
 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456. 
10
 Treaty No. 8 available at http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028813/1100100028853#chp4 [accessed on 
December 22, 2014]  
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In Mikisew Cree Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),
11
  the Canadian government 
approved the construction of a winter road through the Wood Buffalo National Park. The road 
crossed the trap lines of over a dozen families   who resided near the proposed road, and would 
affect up to 100 Cree hunters.    The First Nation argued that the road infringed its hunting and 
fishing rights under Treaty No. 8 and relied on the part of the clause that said that Indians could 
“pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered.”   
 
The Crown, on the other hand, relied on a different part of the same clause – the part that says 
that lands could be “taken up” for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.  
Reading the text of the treaty itself, there does not appear to be any restriction on the process that 
the Crown had to follow to take up lands, nor on how much land the Crown could take up. 
However, the Court did not interpret the clause literally, but rather incorporated Aboriginal 
understandings of what the treaty said. This approach brought the Court to look at how the lands 
taken up clause would evolve over time, and divided the taking up of land into two stages. At the 
first stage, only consultation and accommodation would be required for taking up lands.
12
 At the 
second stage, when so much land was taken up that “no meaningful right to hunt exists over its 
traditional territories”,13 the Crown would have to do more than consult: it would have to justify 
its actions using the test developed in R. v. Sparrow in 1990.
14
  
 
The “Sparrow test” came to be when Ronald Sparrow went fishing for food in an area 
traditionally used by his First Nation. He was charged under the federal Fisheries Act for using a 
net that was longer than that permitted by fisheries regulations.  The Supreme Court of Canada 
found that the regulation could not be permitted to interfere with Sparrow’s Aboriginal right to 
fish for food and ceremonial purposes.  In the course of the decision, the Court set out the 
connection between Aboriginal rights and Crown regulation in a two part test. First, if the Crown 
law infringed an existing Aboriginal right, the law would have to have a “compelling and 
substantial purpose”. The example used in Sparrow was conservation. Second, the Crown 
needed to act honourably by consulting with the First Nation about the legislation, infringing the 
Aboriginal right as little as possible and, where appropriate, providing compensation. This 
“infringe-and-justify” framework   has been applied in over a hundred cases at various levels of 
court that have addressed the duty to consult and accommodate, both in the context of Aboriginal 
rights and treaty rights. To summarize broadly, the cases say that the Crown must engage with 
Indigenous groups and try to address concerns that they raise. Indigenous parties must participate 
in the process and exchange information. Whether the process of consultation and the substantive 
accommodations proposed by the Crown or project proponents is sufficient to meet the legal 
standard is up to the courts. If a court finds that the Crown has met the standard to consult and 
accommodate, then the project can proceed. If the standard is not met, the Court may impose 
                                                 
11
 Mikisew Cree Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005]  3 S.C.R. 388.     
12
 Ibid,  para. 55. 
13
 Ibid,.  para. 48. See also, Keewatin v Ontario  (Natural  Resources),  2014  SCC 48, para 52. 
14
 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
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conditions or may require further consultation and accommodation. Many of these cases mention 
that the First Nation does not have a veto.
15
 In this context, “no veto” means that the final 
decision on whether the project proceeds does not lie in the hands of the Indigenous group, but 
rather in the hands of the Court. To look at the issue from the Crown or project proponent 
perspective, the fact that Indigenous groups have “no veto” does not mean that the project will 
necessary go ahead. The Court will determine whether the procedural and substantive standards 
have been met.  
  
I will return to the discussion of “no veto” in the next section where I discuss the relationship 
between the concept of veto and the concept of consent. 
 
  
III. Consent and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
At the international level, developments on relations between States and Indigenous peoples 
began with an assimilationist approach evident in the Indigenous and Tribal Populations 
Convention (“ILO 107”) of the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted in 1957.16  ILO 
107 was aimed at “integration” and focused on individual equality rights. By the mid-eighties, it 
became clear that Indigenous peoples themselves did not favour such an approach and the ILO 
drafted another convention, ILO 169, named the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989.
17
 The change from “populations” to “peoples” signalled a change in direction, to explicitly 
recognize the existence of Indigenous collectivities. ILO 169 went further requiring that 
Indigenous people be consulted: 
 
… governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult 
these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests 
would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the 
exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands.
18
 
   
The growing international movement for indigenous rights led by Indigenous people resulted in 
the enactment of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People in 2007 
(UNDRIP).
19
 This declaration recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, 
                                                 
15
 For example, see Behn v. Moulton, Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, para. 29. 
16
 International Labor Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107), online: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312252:
NO. The ILO is a specialized body of the United Nations, that is made up of representatives of workers, employers 
and governments. It was the first organization to have an instrument directed specifically at Indigenous people. 
17
 International Labor Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), online: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:
NO. The requirement to consult in ILO 169 came a year before the Supreme Court of Canada released R. v. Sparrow 
which said that consultation was necessary before infringing Aboriginal rights. 
18
 Ibid, Article 15.2. 
19
 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP]  UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 
2007), online: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf  (accessed December 22, 2014). 
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preservation of their cultures and rights to land in their territories. The provision that is most 
relevant for this chapter is found in Article 32 which provides that indigenous people must give 
their free prior and informed consent (FPIC):   
 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of 
mineral, water or other resources.
20
 
  
The government of Canada’s reaction to these provisions has been baffling. Canada was one of 
only four countries in the world to vote against the adoption of UDRIP in 2007, and in 2014 at 
the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, when every nation in the General Assembly 
endorsed the principles of UNDRIP, Canada stood alone to raise an objection to the consent 
standard because in its view, requiring consent would mean that Indigenous people would have a 
veto over projects on their traditional lands.
21
 
 
The government of Canada was sharply out of step with international developments and even 
domestic developments in the private sector.  In the sections below, I outline the adoption of 
some sort of consent standard by a number of international and Canadian institutions to illustrate 
the depth and diversity of support for FPIC. 
22
 
  
 (i)  The International Finance Corporation  
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in 1956 to offer investment, 
advisory, and asset management services with the aim of encouraging private sector 
development in developing countries. A member of the World Bank Group   headquartered in 
Washington, D.C., the IFC is owned, and its policies are determined by, its 184 member 
countries. Its current work in over 100 developing countries is meant to create jobs, generate tax 
revenues, improve corporate governance and improve environmental performance, by providing 
loans to private sector companies active in emerging markets.
23
  
 
                                                 
20
  Ibid, Article 32. 
21
 “Canada’s Statement on the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples Outcome Document, New York  22 
September 2014”  online: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/statements-
declarations/other-autres/2014-09-22_WCIPD-PADD.aspx?lang=eng  (accessed December 22, 2014). 
22
 I am not providing an exhaustive list of relevant instruments, some of which do not mention free, prior, informed 
consent. For example, the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises have not been updated since 2011 and do not set out any standards specifically for Indigenous peoples.  
Online: http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/ (accessed December 22, 2014). As well, I am not going to focus on 
different iterations of the consent standard, nor address the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of the voluntary 
standards themselves. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework for incorporating consent into the 
implementation of treaties, and is not meant to be an analysis of the standards themselves. For an overall review and 
critique of these voluntary standards, see Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap (London: 
Routledge, 2014).  
23
 IFC, “About IFC.”,  online: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+ifc (accessed December 
20, 2014). 
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The IFC has published Performance Standards that loan recipients must follow. These standards 
provide guidance on how to identify and manage risks and impacts. Performance Standard 7 
requires IFC clients to identify adverse impacts on affected Indigenous communities and develop 
action plans to address these impacts with the participation of those communities. The 2006 
version of the Performance Standards mentioned “free, prior, informed consultation” with 
Indigenous peoples, but the 2012 version requires free, prior and informed consent.
24
 
 
According to the IFC, the client company must procure FPIC through good faith negotiation with 
the affected indigenous community as well as document: 1) the mutually accepted process 
between the parties for obtaining consent, and 2) evidence of agreement between the parties on 
the outcome of the negotiations.
25
 The Performance Standard also directs companies to involve 
indigenous peoples’ representative bodies and members of the affected communities, including 
vulnerable groups such as women and youth, and to provide sufficient time for decision-
making.
26
 
 
(ii) The Equator Principles 
 
The Equator Principles provide  a risk management framework for determining, evaluating and 
managing environmental and social risk in projects. They primarily function to “provide a 
minimum standard for due diligence to support responsible risk decision-making”27 and are 
designed to assist member institutions in their decisions to disburse loans to finance particular 
projects. Member institutions commit to implementing and honouring the Equator Principles 
within their internal environmental and social policies, procedures and standards for financing 
projects, and must not provide project financing or project-related corporate loans where the 
client/project either will not or cannot comply with the Principles. 
 
The establishment of the Equator Principles has brought social/community standards and 
responsibility, such as those regarding indigenous peoples, labour/employment, and consultation 
with affected local communities, to the forefront within the Project Finance market. In doing so, 
they have helped rally support for the convergence and consensus around common 
environmental and social standards. For instance, multilateral development banks and export 
credit agencies are increasingly drawing on and applying the same standards as the Equator 
Principles.
28
 
 
                                                 
24
 IFC , Performance Standard 7, “Indigenous Peoples” (January 1, 2012)  online: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845faa8c6a8312a/PS7_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPER
ES (accessed December 20, 2014). 
25
 Ibid, para.12. 
26
 Ibid, para.18. 
27
 Equator Principles, About the Equator Principles, online: http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/ep3/ep3/38-about/about/195 (accessed December 22, 2014). 
28
 Ibid 
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Currently, there are 80 members in 34 countries. They are among the most important financial 
institutions in the world including Banco Santander, Bank of America, JP Morgan Bank, 
Barclays and all five of the major banks in Canada. These institutions cover more than 70 
percent of international Project Finance debt in emerging markets.
29
 
 
The requirement for “free, prior, informed consent” in Equator Principles III, was instituted in 
2013, a change from the preceding requirement for “free, prior, informed consultation” found in 
Equator Principles II.
30
 
 
(iii) The International Council on Mining and Metals 
  
The International Council of Mining and Metals (“ICMM”) was established in 2001 to improve 
sustainable development performance in the mining and metals industry. It brings together 22 
mining and metals companies as well as 33 national and regional mining associations and global 
commodity associations, to address core sustainable development challenges.
31
 Canadian 
members are Barrick Gold, Goldcorp, Teck, the Mining Association of Canada and the 
Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada.  
 
In May 2013, a new Indigenous Peoples and Mining Position Statement explicitly requires its 
member companies to “work to obtain the consent of indigenous communities for new projects 
(and changes to existing projects) that are located on lands traditionally owned by or under 
customary use of Indigenous Peoples and are likely to have significant adverse impacts on 
Indigenous Peoples”.32 This is a significant shift from the prior position which only required 
consultation.
33
 
 
(iv) Akwé:Kon Guidelines 
 
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity came into force in December 1993. It 
promotes “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources.”34  One part of 
the Convention addresses traditional knowledge of Indigenous people. In order to ensure that 
traditional knowledge was included in cultural, environmental and social impact assessments, 
                                                 
29
 Ibid 
30
 Equator Principles, The Equator Principles III - 2013, online:  http://www.equator-rinciples.com/index.php/ep3 
accessed December 22, 2014). 
31
 International Council on Mining and Metals, About Us, online: http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us 
(accessed December 22, 2014).  
32
 Indigenous Peoples and Mining Position Statement (May 2013) online: http://www.icmm.com/document/5433 
33
 Sarah A Altschuller, “ICMM Releases Position Statement on Indigenous Peoples Establishing Commitment to 
FPIC”, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (30 May 2013) online:   
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2013/05/icmm-releases-position-statement-on-indigenous-peoples-establishing-
commitment-to-fpic/ (accessed December 22, 2014). 
34
 Convention on Biological Diversity, “History of the Convention”  online: http://www.cbd.int/history/ 
9 | P a g e  
 
the members of the Convention developed the Akwé: Kon Guidelines in 2012. These guidelines 
state that consultations with Indigenous groups should include a way for the local and indigenous 
communities to “have the option to accept or oppose a proposed development that may impact 
on their community”.35 
  
(iv) The Boreal Leadership Council 
 
The purpose of this Canadian organization is to establish “a network of large interconnected 
protected areas covering about half of the country's Boreal Forest and the use of leading-edge 
sustainable development practices in remaining areas.”36 The seventeen members of the 
Canadian Boreal Leadership Council come from the finance sector, Indigenous groups, non-
government organizations and the forestry industry.
37
   
 
The Council believes that the development of the boreal forest requires the  free, prior, informed 
consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned. In September 2012, the Council released Free 
Prior Informed Consent in Canada, a guidebook that provides information on best practices for 
implementing FPIC. 
38
 
 
(v) Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada 
 
The Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (“PDAC”) is the largest mining body in 
Canada, with more than 1200 corporate and 9000 individual members. It published  e3 Plus – A 
Framework for Responsible Exploration in order to help resource exploration companies 
improve their social, environmental,  health and safety performance and to comprehensively 
integrate these three aspects into all their exploration programs. e3 Plus is a voluntary guideline 
designed to help  explorers in their decision-making for exploration projects around the world.
39
  
 
The e3 Plus guidelines say that “the concept of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) provides 
a standard for interaction with indigenous communities.”40 As  a member of the International 
Council on Mining and Metals, PDAC has subscribed to the consent requirement as articulated 
by that organization.  
 
                                                 
35
 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Akwè: Kon Guidelines (2004), article 8(e) online: 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-brochure-en.pdf  (accessed December 22, 2014). 
36
 Boreal Leadership Council, online: http://borealcouncil.ca/ (accessed December 22, 2014). 
37
 Ibid, Members, http://borealcouncil.ca/members/  (accessed December 22, 2014). 
38
  Ibid, Free Prior Informed Consent in Canada (September 2012) online: 
http://www.borealcanada.ca/documents/FPICReport-English-web.pdf (accessed December 22, 2014). 
39
 Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada, About PDAC, online: PDAC <http://www.pdac.ca/about-pdac> 
(accessed December 22, 2014). 
40
 Ibid, e3 Plus Principles and Guidance Notes , 80 online: http://www.pdac.ca/docs/default-source/e3-plus---
principles/e3-plus-principles-amp-guidance-notes---update-2014.pdf  (accessed December 22, 2014) 
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Having reviewed five examples of the use of the consent standard, I turn to reasons why the 
standard makes sense for such a diverse group of institutions.  
 
IV. Why does it make sense for financial institutions and industry to require the consent of 
Indigenous peoples? 
  
Because consult is a lower standard, it would seem to be easier to go forward with development 
projects because the Indigenous party can never say “no”. Getting consent from the community 
would require another barrier for projects to overcome and would appear to make it more 
difficult for projects to go ahead. Why would the private sector be in favour of consent? 
 
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the costs of community conflict are significant and can 
result in serious impacts on companies, including suspensions and closures of projects.  The 
degree of opposition has resulted in violent confrontations across the globe, with thousands of 
people killed, injured and raped, and huge losses to companies.
41
   For example, Newmont’s $US 
4.8  billion Conga project in Peru faced massive opposition including general strikes and road 
blockades. Newmont was forced to “voluntarily” suspend the mine with losses in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars.
42
 The opposition has come at a heavy price for community members 
including the killing of five farmers during one of the protests, as well as many injuries and 
beatings of community leaders. Another example is Canadian company HudBay Minerals, which  
purchased a Guatemalan mine that had been riddled with conflict and assassinations throughout 
its history. The conflicts continued under HudBay’s ownership as it tried to evict Indigenous 
people from the mine site. During one confrontation a community leader was murdered and 
others injured. The head of security of the mining company was charged and jailed. HudBay 
ended up selling the mine for $CAD 176 million in 2011, shortly after it was sued in Canada for 
the murder and for the alleged gang rapes of women that occurred during an earlier eviction 
carried out by the mine’s previous owners.43 HudBay had bought the mine three years before, for 
$CAD 446 million. 
 
In Canada, a conflict between the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation and a junior 
mining company called Platinex would have turned out better for all parties concerned had 
                                                 
41
 For example, see case studies of 22 conflicts involving Canadian companies in Latin America, see  Working 
Group on Mining and Human Rights in Latin America, Canadian Mining in Latin America and Canada’s 
Responsibility (March, 2014) online: 
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/report_canadian_mining_executive_summary.pdf 
42
 Mining.com, “Peru abandons Newmont’s $4.8 billion conga project”  (August 28, 2012) online: 
http://www.mining.com/peru-abandons-newmonts-4-8-billion-conga-project-66180/ (accessed December 22, 2014). 
Earthworks, “ Mining giant Newmont urged to obtain community consent” (April 25, 2013) online: 
http://www.earthworksaction.org/media/detail/mining_giant_newmont_urged_to_obtain_community_consent#.VJX
xiP8OjA (accessed December 22, 2014). 
43
 For a history of the El Estor mine see Shin Imai, Bernadette Maheandiran and Valerie Crystal, “Access to Justice 
and Corporate Accountability: A Legal Case Study of HudBay in Guatemala” (2014) 35 (2) Canadian Journal of 
Development Studies 286-303. 
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consent been the standard.
44
 In this case, the First Nation had asked for a moratorium on mining 
activity in the area since 2001 and insisted that drilling not commence until there had been 
compliance with the First Nation’s Development Protocol which included a referendum in the 
community. When Platinex announced its plan to begin exploration, the First Nation sent a 
strong letter of objection in August 2005. In October 2005 Platinex began raising $1 million by 
selling shares. Platinex did not mention the August letter of objection from the First Nation, and 
instead, told investors that there had been verbal consent by the First Nation.  In February 2006, 
Platinex sent in a drilling team without informing the First Nation.  A confrontation occurred 
with members of the First Nation and the drilling team left.  Platinex then launched a law suit for 
$10 billion against the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug. This was approximately $10 million for 
every man, woman and child on the reserve. The First Nation asked for an injunction to stop 
drilling. 
 
In July 2006,
45
 Smith J. ordered drilling to halt in order to permit consultation and negotiations to 
take place.  Over the next few months, the provincial Ministry of Mines and Northern 
Development joined in the negotiations and appeared at subsequent hearings to support Platinex. 
Various proposals were made to the First Nation with respect to employment, future consultation, 
a community fund, and fees for negotiation and litigation. The First Nation objected to the fact 
that Platinex and the Ministry demanded that the First Nation agree to the drilling before they 
would enter into substantive consultations. By May 1, 2007
46
 the judge decided that the balance 
of convenience had shifted and that an injunction was no longer justified. Drilling for Phase I 
was allowed to proceed. 
 
At a hearing on May, 18 2007
47
 the judge decided that an agreement reached between the 
Ministry and Platinex, without the consent of the First Nation, was satisfactory and should be 
imposed on the First Nation. When the First Nation continued to block exploration activity, the 
judge found that the Chief and the majority of the members of the elected council were guilty of 
contempt of court. At the urging of a lawyer for the Ontario government, who asked that the 
penalty be harsh enough ¨to make it hurt,” the judge sentenced them to six months in jail. The 
matter went up to the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Chief and councillors were released after 
spending two months in jail.
48
   
 
Platinex was still determined to proceed and in August 2009, another attempt was made to land a 
float plane to begin exploration. The plane was prevented from landing by the Chief. Platinex 
then began negotiating with the Ontario Ministry of Northern Development, Mines and Forestry 
                                                 
44
 For a description of this case, see Rachel Ariss and John Cutfeet, Keeping the land : Kitchenuhmaykoosib 
Inninuwug, reconciliation and Canadian law, (Blackpoint: Fernwood, 2012). 
45
 Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug  [2006] OJ No. 3140. [Platinex 2006] 
46
 Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug  [2007]  3 CNLR 181. 
47
 Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug  [2007] OJ No. 2214. 
48
  Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug, (2008), 91 OR (3d) 18 (Ont. C.A.). 
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and settled for a payment of $5 million from the government, far short of the $10 billion 
originally demanded.
49
 
 
Analyzing this situation, we can see that all parties suffered. Platinex lost access to its property. 
Its investors lost – in December 2014, the stock was trading at one cent.50 Ontario taxpayers had 
to pay $5 million, and probably more to cover legal fees, to compensate Platinex. The members 
of the First Nation spent time in jail.
51
 
 
A Harvard University report on company-community conflicts, based on case studies from 
around the world, found that the absence of the opportunity to consent to the project was one of 
the two issues that precipitated conflict.
52
 
 
The reality of community opposition provides practical reasons to consider obtaining consent, 
but there is also a theoretical basis for favouring consent in the thinking of those in the Harvard 
Negotiation Project.  For them, power imbalance is counterproductive. In the words of Lawrence 
Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, “[t]he potential parties to a consensus-building effort cannot 
participate in a relationship in which one party holds all the power.”53  This imbalance may be a 
disincentive for weaker parties to engage in negotiation because they may believe they have 
more effective extra-legal options or they may believe there is more built-in protection in the 
adjudicative system. If there is no true consensus, and the more powerful party imposes a 
solution, even if the solution makes some accommodation for the weaker party, the weaker party 
will not have made a commitment to the solution. This means that the solution will not be as 
durable nor proceed with the cooperation of the weaker party. In situations where there is 
conflict over a mine, it will mean continued conflict.  
 
The problem with the consult standard is that the community feels powerless, because they are 
powerless.  It is difficult to trust a process of discussion when they know that no matter what 
                                                 
49
 Republic of Mining, “K.I. vs. Platinex: a ‘worst case’ example of community relations”  (22 September 2011) 
online: http://www.republicofmining.com/2011/09/22/k-i-vs-platinex-a-%E2%80%98worst-case%E2%80%99-
example-of-community-relations-canadian-business-ethics-research-network/ 
50
 The Globe and Mail, Stock Quote  online: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
investor/markets/stocks/summary/?q=PTX-X# (accessed December 22, 2014). 
51
  Another exploration company, God’s Lake Resources attempted to explore on the territory of the 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib. In this case, the province accepted that the First Nation would not consent to the exploration, 
and paid the company $3.5 million to give up its right to explore.  “Ontario reaches agreement with Gods Lake 
Resources” (March 29, 2012) online: http://news.ontario.ca/mndmf/en/2012/03/ontario-reaches-agreement-with-
gods-lake-resources.html (accessed December 22, 2014). 
52
 Rachel Davis and Daniel Franks, Costs of Community-Company Conflict in the Extractive Sector (Cambridge: 
CSR Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School, 2014),16.  See also Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, “International 
Recognition of Indigenous Rights, Indigenous Control of Development and Domestic Political Mobilisation”, 
(2012) 47 Australian Journal of Political Science 531-545, 542 where he describes Rio Tinto’s promise to seek 
consent from an Indigenous group in Australia. 
53
 Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public 
Disputes (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 
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happens, the final decision is not in their hands. It is through recognition of the necessity of 
consent that indigenous community will have power that can be a balance to the superior 
economic power of the mining company and the superior political power of government. 
 
 
V. What is the difference between consent and veto? 
 
I have indicated above that Canadian courts have said that Indigenous people do not have a veto 
and that Canada raised objections to the consent provisions in the United Nations Declaration on 
Indigenous Peoples at the 2014 World Conference on Indigenous Peoples. Canada said that these 
provisions would give Aboriginal groups the right to a veto and it would be incompatible with 
Canadian law.  
 
(i) The international level and veto 
 
A group of First Nations attending the World Conference expressed outrage at Canada’s position 
and pointed out that the word “veto” does not appear in the UN document. Grand Chief Matthew 
Coon Come of the Grand Council of the Crees stated bluntly,  
 
The government has never explained what it means by 'veto.' Is a 'veto' absolute? If so, 
then a 'veto' isn't the same thing as 'consent.'
54
 
 
James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, takes the 
same position as Coon Come. He says that there is no right to a veto, if it means that Indigenous 
communities can reject any project whatsoever.   
 
When the Special Rapporteur affirms that indigenous people do not enjoy a right to have 
a veto in the context of consultation processes, he refers to the proposition that there is  
absolute power to unilaterally prohibit or impede all proposals and decisions of the state 
which could affect them, based on whatever justification or no justification at all. In his 
view such a proposition is not supportable. To speak of a right to a veto in that sense, in 
relation to matters that can be in the legitimate interests, not only of the indigenous party, 
but also of national society in general, is not consistent with the standard of participatory 
consultation which is incorporated into international norms.
55
 
                                                 
54
 Jenny Uechi, Vancouver Observer “First Nation groups condemn federal government's "indefensible attack" on 
Indigenous rights at UN meeting”  (September 25, 2014)  online: http://www.vancouverobserver.com/news/first-
nation-groups-condemn-federal-governments-indefensible-attack-indigenous-rights-un (accessed December 22, 
2014). 
55
  Declaración pública del Relator Especial sobre los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales de los 
indígenas, James Anaya, sobre la “Ley del derecho a la consulta previa a los pueblos indígenas u originarios 
reconocido en el Convenio No. 169 de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo” aprobada por el Congreso de la 
República del Perú, 7 de julio de 2010, punto 1 [Public Declaration of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples on the “Law on the right to prior consultation of indigenous and 
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Although Anaya does not think that there exists an absolute veto, he goes on to say that 
Indigenous communities can refuse to grant their consent when the project would have a 
significant impact. 
 
 In those cases in which the impact of a proposal or initiative on the well-being and rights 
of an Indigenous people is significant, the consent of the indigenous party, through an 
agreement, is not only the objective of consultation, but also a necessary precondition for 
carrying out the proposed measures.
56 
 
At the international level, then, the debate is not over whether there is a veto or not, but over the 
circumstances in which consent is required. The consent issue was addressed by the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights in the case of Pueblo Saramaka vs. Surinam.
57
 The Saramaka 
are descendants of escaped slaves who have lived in the rainforest since the seventeenth century. 
They carved out their own territory, which they were able to protect from intruders until the mid-
twentieth century. At that time, the government of Surinam began displacing the Saramaka for 
logging and mining. The Saramaka brought a complaint to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, which released its decision in November 28, 2007. The Court referred to the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People to find that the Saramaka had the right to 
be consulted and to consent before mineral and forestry development in their territory. 
 
… the Court considers that, regarding large-scale development or investment projects that 
would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the State has a duty, not only to 
consult with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, 
according to their customs and traditions.58 
 
It is fair to say that the precise parameters for identifying when consent is required are still in 
development.  The Inter-American Court itself provides three iterations of the test. The above 
quote from the 2007 judgment mentions “large-scale development or investment projects” that 
would have a “major impact within Saramaka territory.”  Three paragraphs later in the judgment, 
the court describes the required impact as “a profound impact on the property rights of the 
members of the Saramaka people to a large part of their territory.”59 In an Interpretive Judgment 
from 2008, the Court says that consent is necessary when the impact “could affect the integrity 
of the Saramaka people’s lands and natural resources.”60 
                                                                                                                                                             
original peoples recognized in ILO 169 of the International Labour Organization, 7 July 2010] [unofficial translation 
by author] online: http://www.ohchr.org/SP/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10194&LangID=S 
56
 Ibid, point 4. 
57
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), (November 27, 2007) Series C No 82. 
58
 Ibid, para. 134. 
59
 Ibid, para. 137. 
60
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Interpretation of Saramaka Judgment (12 August 2008), Ser C, No 185, 
6 [17] (emphasis added). I wish to thank Jackie Hartley PhD Candidate, University of New South Wales for 
bringing these differences in wording to my attention.  
15 | P a g e  
 
 
UNDRIP provides specific examples of when consent is required from Indigenous peoples: 
relocation from their lands and territories;
61
 the taking of their cultural, intellectual, religious or 
spiritual property;
62
  taking of “lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied or used”;63 and the storage of hazardous materials on Indigenous 
lands.
64
  
 
The International Financial Corporation’s Performance Standard 7 sets out four similar 
circumstances to trigger free prior informed consent: adverse impacts on lands and natural 
resources that are subject to traditional ownership or customary use;
65
 relocation from 
communally held lands;
66
 significant project impacts on critical cultural heritage;
67
 use of 
cultural heritage, including knowledge, innovations and practices, for commercial purposes.
68
 
 
In 2012, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, an advisory body to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, provided a more comprehensive description: 
 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires that the free, prior and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples be obtained in matters of fundamental 
importance to their rights, survival, dignity and well-being. In assessing whether a matter 
is of importance to the indigenous peoples concerned, relevant factors include the 
perspective and priorities of the indigenous peoples concerned, the nature of the matter or 
proposed activity and its potential impact on the indigenous peoples concerned, taking 
into account, inter alia, the cumulative effects of previous encroachments or activities and 
historical inequities faced by the indigenous peoples concerned.
69
 
 
We can see that a number of formulations for the circumstances when consent is required are 
being developed at the international level. I do not intend to parse the differences in wording, nor 
analyze the specific circumstances that have been highlighted, as in this chapter, I focus more on 
the larger trajectory of the need to obtain consent. 
 
(ii) Canadian courts and consent 
 
                                                 
61
 UNDRIP, supra n 18, Article 10. 
62
 Ibid, Article 11. 
63
 Ibid, Article 28.2. 
64
 Ibid, Article 29.2. 
65
 IFC, supra n 23, para. 13 and 14. 
66
 Ibid, para 15. 
67
 Ibid, para. 16. 
68
 Ibid, para. 17. 
69
 Human Rights Council, Expert Mechanism,  Follow-up report on indigenous peoples and the right to participate 
in decision- making, with a focus, on extractive industries A/HRC/21/55 (16 August 2012), para.22. 
online: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/160/59/PDF/G1216059.pdf?OpenElement 
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We can now turn to decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, where the focus has been on the 
duty to consult and accommodate.  The cases below discuss Aboriginal title claims in situations 
where there are no treaties. I apply these principles to the treaty context in Part VII. 
 
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
70
  the Supreme Court of Canada approached the concept of 
consent in the context of Aboriginal title. Chief Justice Lamer noted that arising from the 
Crown’s fiduciary duty toward Aboriginal peoples, “[t]here is always a duty of consultation”. He 
further noted, 
 
The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary within the circumstances. In 
occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will be no more 
than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held 
pursuant to aboriginal title…In most cases, it will be significantly deeper than mere 
consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, 
particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal 
lands. 
71
  
 
So Delgamuuk tentatively identifies a sphere of activity where consent is required. However, this 
case also provides limits on how the First Nation uses Aboriginal title lands because of the 
special bond that exists between the nation and the land. 
 
… if occupation is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting ground, 
then the group that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land may not use it in such 
a fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g. by strip mining it). Similarly, if a 
group claims a special bond with the land because of its ceremonial or cultural 
significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to destroy that relationship (e.g. by 
developing it in such a way that the bond is destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a 
parking lot.)
72
 
 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Xeni Gwet’in v. British 
Columbia.
73
 The Court found that the Tsilhqot’in First Nation had Aboriginal title over 1,750 sq. 
km.  (675 sq. mi.) of land in British Columbia, which gave them the right to decide how the land 
will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land;  the right to possess the land; the 
right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage the 
land.
74
  As a general proposition, then, consent of the First Nation would be necessary for 
government or a company to use Aboriginal title land. However, in a somewhat puzzling move, 
the Court decided the Crown could dispense with consent when the land would be needed for 
agriculture, mining, lumbering, building of infrastructure and settlement. In order to override the 
lack of consent, the Crown would have to comply with the Sparrow test and show, among other 
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 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010. 
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73
 Xeni Gwet’in v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44. 
74
 Ibid, para.73. 
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things, that there was a “compelling and substantial” purpose for dispensing with consent and    
that the Crown had consulted with the First Nation.
75
  However, in another puzzling move, 
although the Crown can override lack of consent from the Tsilhqot’in, it cannot do so if it would 
“substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land.”76 This is starting to look like 
a Russian doll, with exceptions buried within exceptions. 
 
To summarize where we are so far, we see that the Xeni Gwet’in established that the Tsilhqot’in 
have Aboriginal title and that consent is  necessary for using their lands, but that the requirement 
for consent could not necessarily prevent agriculture, mining, lumbering, building of 
infrastructure and settlement, because the Crown could override the lack of consent using the 
Sparrow test. However, the Crown override does not apply to projects that would deprive future 
generations of the benefit of the land, so that the Crown´s authority has an outer limit. Does this 
mean that the Tsilhqot’in themselves can consent to uses that would deprive future generations 
of the use of the land?  Apparently not. Although the Court finds that  the Tsilhqot’in can put  
their lands to use in “modern ways”, the Tsilhqot’in’s land cannot “be developed or misused in a 
way that would substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land.”77  
Consequently, it appears that Aboriginal title provides absolute protection of the land for the 
future.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
  This Canadian framework different from the international approach which protects the sphere 
of detrimental impact by requiring free, prior and informed consent by Indigenous people. Both 
the international and Canadian approaches recognize that there is something special about the 
link between the land and Indigenous people that needs to be protected. However, the Canadian 
approach to date fails to provide sufficient agency and recognition to the role of the Indigenous 
group. The Canadian approach is Crown-centric and primarily concerned with Crown conduct in 
relation to Indigenous people. This is obvious from the questions in the Sparrow test – is the 
Crown infringing Aboriginal rights, is the Crown consulting, is the Crown acting honourably?  
The international consent standard, on the other hand, adds a focus on the Indigenous group as 
well. States have obligations to consult and ensure that there is free, prior, informed consent and 
this requirement puts Indigenous groups at the centre of the process in a way that the Sparrow 
test’s infringe-and-justify test for the Crown does not. 
 
In the next section, I will provide some preliminary ideas on how the consent standard could be 
applied to implement treaties in Canada. 
  
 VI. Court adoption of best practices standards 
 
                                                 
75
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77
 Ibid, para. 74. 
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While the private sector corporate social responsibility initiatives have helped to bring 
discussions on consent into the mainstream, the initiatives themselves generally do not provide 
any form of redress for individual complaints, and are unenforceable against the companies 
themselves. As such, in cases where there is an allegation of a breach by one of the signing 
institutions, the complainant is left with little or no recourse. 
 
For instance, the Equator Principles simply oblige member institutions to require any company 
with whom they deal to establish a grievance mechanism designed to receive and facilitate 
resolution of concerns about a project’s environmental and social performance within the 
company or project itself. However, the Equator Principles do not impose a duty on its members 
to adopt grievance mechanisms of their own. Consequently, if someone feels that a member bank 
has lent money for a project that does not have Indigenous consent, there is no avenue for 
complaining to the bank or the Equator Principles organization.
78
 
 
There are similar problems with the other standards. The e3 Plus guidelines from the Prospectors 
and Developers Association of Canada are not mandatory for members and there is no way to 
determine which, if any, companies have adopted them. The International Council on Mining 
Metals make their guidelines mandatory to their members, but there is no way of complaining if 
there is a breach. Their web site states that if the ICCM office receives a complaint it is referred 
directly to the company and that ICCM itself does not address or mediate issues between a third 
party and a member.
79
 The Boreal Leadership Council developed their guidelines on free, prior, 
informed consent to “encourage and contribute to a solutions-based dialogue” 80, but the Council 
does not police adherence to the guidelines. Similarly, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines of the 
Secretariat on the UN Convention on Biological Diversity does not police implementation of its 
guidelines.  
 
Of the standards studied in this chapter, only the International Finance Corporation’s   
Performance Standards is equipped with a grievance mechanism, the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman (“CAO”), an independent recourse mechanism for projects supported by the private 
sector agencies of the World Bank Group. Indigenous groups can make a direct complaint to this 
agency rather than the company against whom they are making the complaint. However, the 
CAO merely “responds to complaints from project-affected communities” by “help[ing] parties 
identify alternatives for resolving the issues of concern”. The CAO has explicitly stated that it 
                                                 
78
  For general commentary on the Equator Principles, see Simons and  Macklin, supra, n 21, 142-150. 
79
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does not “impose solutions or find fault”,81 so remedies to individuals or enforcement against the 
company is not within its mandate.
82
  
 
While the consent standards described above do not provide any direct remedies to Indigenous 
communities, they do give an indication of what some bodies consider to be “best practices” for 
the industry. The actions of particular government or industry players can be judged against the 
best practices suggested for the industry in judicial proceedings.  
  
For example, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines of the Convention on Biological Diversity are not 
directly binding on anyone, but the Inter-American Court on Human Rights took note of the 
Guidelines as a standard for assessing behaviour of the government of Surinam in the 
consultation process in the Saramaka case. The Court called the Guidelines “[o]ne of the most 
comprehensive and used standards for [Environmental and Social Impact Assessments] in the 
context of indigenous and tribal Peoples.” 83 
 
In Ontario, two cases referred to the Aboriginal engagement guidelines published by the 
Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada. I have already indicated that these guidelines 
are voluntary and even PDAC members are not obliged to follow them.  However, two courts in 
Ontario have used the standard as a touchstone for company behaviour.  In Wahgoshig First 
Nation v. Solid Gold Resources Corp,
84
 Solid Gold, a small exploratory company headquartered 
in Sudbury, refused to consult with the Wahgoshig First Nation, in spite of being advised to do 
so by the Ontario government. When Solid Gold attempted to continue exploring, the First 
Nation took the matter to court.  In granting an injunction against further exploration, Justice 
Carole Brown wrote: “it…appears that Solid Gold has failed to meet industry standards for 
responsible exploration as set forth by the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada 
with respect to First Nations engagement”.85   
 
Another example is the Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation described 
above.
86
 Smith J., the judge in this case, noted that Platinex did not follow the Prospectors and 
Developers Association of Canada’s Best Practices Exploration and Environmental Excellence 
Standards which stated that before drilling is to commence on lands under an Aboriginal claim, 
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82
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the drilling company should sign a memorandum of understanding.
87
  This was one of the factors 
the led the judge to suspend drilling until consultations had taken place.  
 
VII. Application of consent standard to numbered treaties 
  
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, I am going to sketch out some preliminary thoughts 
on a legal framework for consent, building on existing case law. The three characteristics of the 
numbered treaties that are relevant to this discussion are the clause “surrendering” their 
traditional territories; the hunting and fishing/lands taken up clause; and the creation of reserves. 
The reserves are small pieces of land, perhaps 20 sq. mi., which are under a separate   Indian Act 
legal regime that does not apply here. The lands that are the subject of this analysis are large 
tracts that are covered by the treaty, but that are outside of the reserves. I refer to these as “treaty 
lands.”  The fact pattern I have proposed is for extractive industry access to treaty lands (i.e. off 
reserve), not covered by a land claims agreement, not patented (i.e. Crown lands), in a rural area. 
 
There are three building blocks to my analysis. 
 
(i) Courts have found that there is an Indian interest in treaty lands in spite of the 
“surrender clause”. 
(ii) Courts have found that the Crown has neither unilateral nor unlimited power to take 
up lands for extractive industry, in spite of the “lands taken up clause”.  There is a duty to 
consult and accommodate for any taking up of lands, but in cases where the taking up 
will impact the meaningful right to harvest, the Crown must justify its actions using the 
Sparrow test. I argue that there should be negotiations to identify how much land is 
needed to maintain a meaningful right to harvest. Until there are such negotiations, there 
should be a presumption that any taking up of lands from now on will impact the 
meaningful right to harvest. 
(iii) Mikisew Cree case, discussed in Part II,  dealt with the “taking up” of lands and said 
that “compelling and substantial” purposes that could justify taking away the meaningful 
right to harvest. I argue that further “taking up of lands” should require Indigenous 
consent.       
 
(i) The surrender clause 
 
The fact that the written versions of the treaty say that the land was “surrendered” to the Crown 
raises the question of the nature of the Indian interest on lands that are covered by the treaty, but 
that are outside of the reserves.  
 
The “surrender” clause in Treaty No. 8 reads: 
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… the said Indians DO HEREBY CEDE, RELEASE, SURRENDER AND YIELD UP to 
the Government of the Dominion of Canada, for Her Majesty the Queen and Her 
successors for ever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever, to the lands included 
within the following limits …. 88 
 
First Nations say that they never considered the treaties to be real estate deals – rather, they were 
meant to create relationships with the Crown. There is plenty of evidence that in various 
negotiations, the Indians were told that their livelihoods would not change. Michael Coyle 
explains the problems arising from the different understandings of the treaties in his chapter of 
this book.  Although there is some judicial support for questioning the validity of the surrender 
clause as it is set out in the written version of the treaty,
89
 most courts assume that the surrender 
is valid, and that rights to the land have been alienated. If the surrender is valid, can consent from 
Indigenous groups be required for the use land that belongs to the Crown?  
 
For our purposes, I do not think that we need to answer the question of who “owns” the land 
directly. Whether or not there was a total surrender of the land, it is not disputed that treaty First 
Nations have an interest in their traditional lands arising from their traditional use and occupancy 
of the land. The right to continue to use the land for harvesting purposes is written into the treaty 
through the “lands taken up” clause. As indicated earlier in this chapter, this clause, if read 
literally, gives the Crown unlimited unilateral authority to take up lands until there is nothing left 
for the harvesting activities. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, in Mikisew Cree and in 
Keewatin recognized that the Crown´s authority was not unlimited – the First Nation needs 
enough land to “meaningfully” exercise harvesting rights. Nor could the Crown exercise its 
authority unilaterally, as the Court imposed a requirement to consult and accommodate the First 
Nation before taking up the lands.  
 
Canadian law is consistent with the thinking on the nature of Indigenous interest in land at the 
international level. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples refers to 
“lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used”.90 The International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 7, which is incorporated 
into both the Equator Principles and the International Council on Mining and Metals standards, 
specifically provides for the requirement of consent on lands that are “traditionally owned or 
under customary use”. Legal title or demarcation is not necessary. 
Indigenous Peoples are often closely tied to their lands and related natural resources. 
Frequently, these lands are traditionally owned or under customary use. While 
Indigenous Peoples may not possess legal title to these lands as defined by national law, 
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their use of these lands, including seasonal or cyclical use, for their livelihoods, or 
cultural, ceremonial, and spiritual purposes that define their identity and community, can 
often be substantiated and documented.
91
 
 
(ii) The “meaningful right to harvest” and negotiations 
 
As we have seen, the Crown is required to consult, but not justify, taking up lands until the point 
where there is no longer enough land to “meaningfully” exercise harvesting rights. One of the 
practical challenges, then, is trying to decide when that point in time is reached. How do we 
know when a particular project will send us off the edge? Is anyone keeping track?   
 
Individual decisions based on the rights of individuals to hunt or fish, or judicial review of the 
adequacy of consultations in individual project proposals, do not provide the overview necessary 
to determine whether the taking up of land in a particular treaty area is approaching the point in 
time when the “meaningful right” disappears. For example, in 2004, the Salteau First Nations 
argued that there needed to be a study of the cumulative impacts of development because “if 
approvals are not considered broadly in context, small incremental infringements may threaten 
treaty rights by ‘death by a thousand cuts’.”92 This anxiety is not misplaced because almost every 
square centimetre of land in Canada is subject to some type of non-Indigenous interest, ranging 
from mining concessions and water rights for private companies to rights of way for recreational 
snowmobilers. Furthermore, there is legislation in the provinces that will permit an automatic 
“taking up” with no scrutiny or notice whatsoever. For example, the free entry system for mines 
in British Columbia allows company to stake claims without obtaining any prior approval from 
government,
93
 and the Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld provincial legislation that dedicates 
highways for public use by the passage of time, without requiring any decision on anyone’s 
part.
94
 
 
In spite of these continual creeping encroachments, at the present time, there is no systematic 
process for gathering information on what rights need to be “meaningfully” protected, nor on 
how much land needs to be set aside to protect those rights. 
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Courts are struggling. A trio of cases illustrate how difficult it is to operationalize the test in 
Mikisew Cree.  In Yahey v. British Columbia 
95
  the Blueberry River First Nations (|BRFN), 
which are protected by Treaty No. 8, commissioned a study that showed development in their 
traditional territory has resulted in 2/3 of their territory being used for industry or within 250 
meters of an industrial location. At this rate, by 2060 there would be no land left for hunting and 
fishing activities guaranteed by the treaty. The First Nation asked for an injunction on the sale of 
certain timber licences. The Court denied the injunction on the basis that stopping the particular 
timber licences would only affect a small portion of the treaty territory, and that the First Nation 
should seek a general moratorium on all development in the area. 
 
BRFN may be able to persuade the court that a more general and wide-ranging hold on 
industrial activity is needed to protect its treaty rights until trial. However, if the court is 
to consider such a far-reaching order, it should be on an application that frankly seeks 
that result and allows the court to fully appreciate the implications and effects of what it 
is being asked to do. The public interest will not be served by dealing with the matter on 
a piecemeal, project-by-project basis.
96
 
 
In Prophet River First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Environment),
97
 four other Treaty 
No. 8 First Nations challenged the approval of an environmental assessment for a dam on the 
Peace River that would have created a reservoir of 9,330 hectares. The First Nation argued that 
development in the Peace River basin would take away the meaningful right to hunt and 
therefore, infringe the rights in the treaty. The British Columbia Supreme Court decided that the 
Ministers, in approving the environmental assessment, did not have to take into consideration 
whether the impact on treaty lands would take away the meaningful right to hunt. Rather, the 
only obligation was to ensure that there was deep consultation. The Court suggested that the 
larger issues on treaty infringement needed to be raised in an action that would address the issue 
for the whole territory. 
 
The problem with the “piecemeal” approach for the First Nation is that each development, taken 
in isolation, will not likely infringe the treaty. But if the First Nation cannot raise these issues in 
a specific case, it will be left to do what the judge suggests – an action for a moratorium on all 
development in the treaty territory. One could imagine that a court would be hard pressed to 
impose such a wide-ranging moratorium on development, and one would anticipate a significant 
backlash from the non-native population.  
 
A different aspect of the problem is raised in Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation v. Canada 
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(Minister of the Environment) 
98
   In that case, an environmental panel found that the Shell 
Canada Energy Jackpine Energy Expansion in northern Alberta would have extensive 
irreversible adverse impacts on the land and culture of the First Nation covered by Treaty No. 
8. Nonetheless, the governments decided to proceed with the project after a six year study that 
included “deep consultation” with the First Nation. However, if there is an infringement of a 
treaty right, as appears to be the case here, whether the consultation is adequate is the wrong 
test. It seems to me that in this case, we are not dealing with a consultation problem, but rather 
a problem relating to the infringement of the treaty which would have required the application 
of the Sparrow test.  
 
Summing up where these cases take us, we can see that the Yahey case makes it impossible to 
raise the larger issues relating to a meaningful right to hunt in an injunction for specific licenses, 
and Prophet River suggests that the issue cannot be addressed in the environmental assessment 
process.  The Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation case shows that even if the First Nation were 
able to show treaty infringement, deep consultation would be enough to permit the project to go 
ahead. If these three cases articulate the present law, the courts have closed off a substantive 
consideration of whether the “meaningful right” described in Mikisew Cree has been infringed.  
These cases have not attempted to construct a viable framework for assessing when the 
“meaningful right” to hunt has disappeared.     
I have argued that the treaty lands problem can only be resolved through a process that will set 
aside enough lands to preserve the meaningful right to hunt, fish and trap.
99
  More 
comprehensive negotiations on treaties as a whole were recommended by the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples in 1985,
100
 and by Michael Coyle in his chapter for this book. Until such 
treaty negotiations take place, I suggest that there should be a presumption that every new taking 
of lands will affect the “meaningful” right mentioned in the treaty.  Otherwise, every taking of 
land without consent will add to the degradation of the treaty promise. Unfortunately, there is no 
such large-picture process in place. Until there Crown agrees to enter into a process for 
identifying and setting aside treaty lands to fulfill treaty processes, courts can help address the 
issue in two ways.   
 
First, courts should look at development on treaty lands, not as issues relating to consultation, but 
issues relating to treaty infringement. In other words, new timber licences do not require 
consultation and accommodation, but rather require justification for infringement. By applying 
the Sparrow test, the courts would look for the Crown to do more than consult. The Crown 
would have to show that there was as little infringement as possible, that there was adequate 
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compensation and that there was some justification for the granting of the licence in the first 
place.  
 
Second, courts should anticipate that any future development would affect the meaningful 
exercise of rights guaranteed in treaties. This would suggest that the courts should encourage the 
Crown and non-native parties to take into consideration the fact that use of lands in the future is 
contingent on the settling of the larger questions on the fulfillment of treaty rights. Such an 
approach would result in a different decision in a case like Buffalo River Dene Nation v. 
Saskatchewan (Minister of Energy and Resources)
101
 In that case, the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal held that consultation was not required before the issuing of an exploration permit, 
because there would be no actual impact until a second permit for exploitation was issued. The 
court reasoned: 
 
To trigger [the duty to consult] actual foreseeable adverse impacts on an identified treaty 
or Aboriginal right or claim must flow from the impugned Crown conduct.  While the test 
[for consultation] admits possible adverse impacts, there must be a direct link between 
the adverse impacts and the impugned Crown conduct. If adverse impacts are not 
possible until after a later-in-time, independent decision, then it is that later decision that 
triggers the duty to consult. 
102
 
 
However, the exploration stage is not benign. It sets in motion a set of expectations and financial 
relationships. The Court itself notes that the exploration companies must raise money from 
investors.  These investors should know what interests the First Nations will assert if exploitation 
will begin. It is not fair to allow exploration companies to keep investors in the dark. If a First 
Nation has a strong position against development of resources on that particular part of their 
territory, investors should know before speculating on the exploration company. This would 
suggest that consultation should be mandatory, as the specific project could be subject to large 
picture decisions on the availability of the land to fulfill treaty promises. 
 
 
 (iii) Adopt the consent standard 
 
I began by describing the three elements of the original legal framework for the numbered 
treaties: recognition of an Indigenous collective; recognition of an  interest of the collectivity in 
their lands; and recognition of the necessity of obtaining consent to access those lands. 
 
After a dark century where neither government nor courts recognized any of the three elements 
of the framework, reconstruction began toward the end of the twentieth century. Today, a decade 
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and a half into the twenty-first century, the recognition of  Indigenous collectivities and their 
interest in their lands are well settled. However, Canadian courts have not yet explicitly started 
developing a law around consent. Instead, courts in Canada have been focusing on consultation 
and accommodation embedded in an overall lack of a “veto” by Indigenous people. I argue in 
Part V that an advantage of the consent standard being developed internationally is that it puts 
Indigenous people at the centre of the decision on land in a way that the infringe-and-justify 
framework does not. In this Part, I argue that we are at the precipice of losing the meaningful 
right to harvest and that there is a legal and moral imperative to require consent of the First 
Nation for further taking up of lands. I also point out the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Delgumuukw contemplated the necessity of consent when hunting, fishing and trapping rights 
would be taken away.  
 
But my views are also informed by the fact that consent is already the “best practice” for the 
extractive industries. International State-sponsored institutions such as the United Nations, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the 
World Bank as well private sector bodies such as the Equator Principles, the International 
Council on Mining and Metals and the Boreal Leadership Council have already adopted the 
consent standard. The adoption of this standard makes sense both practically and theoretically. 
For the practical utility of the standard, I have given the example the high cost of conflict in the 
multi-billion dollar Conga project in Peru that has been suspended by Newmont, and in Canada, 
the halting of exploratory activities on the treaty lands of the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug. 
For the theoretical advantage of respecting the consent standard, I have pointed to negotiating 
theory which suggests that the greater equality of bargaining power that comes with the 
recognition of the necessity of consent, which will more likely lead to better and more durable 
outcomes.  
 
In Canada, recognizing consent is more a conceptual barrier for governments and the courts, than 
an actual practical concern.  Industry practice has largely moved to the consent standard in the 
form of Impact Benefit Agreements (IBA’s), which are agreements that are negotiated directly 
between companies and Indigenous communities. In return for a promise from the community 
not to oppose the project, the company will provide monetary benefits, some training and 
perhaps some form of environmental monitoring.
103
  In spite of highly publicized conflicts like 
that of the Kitchenuhmaykoosib, the majority of projects in Canada are able to proceed after 
signing IBA’s.  
 
Government as well has largely moved to seeking agreements with First Nations on large land 
claims. The federal and provincial governments were first forced into negotiations with the Cree 
and Inuit of Quebec in 1973 when an ambitious hydro-electric project was temporarily halted by 
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a Quebec court that recognized an Aboriginal interest in land.
104
 Although the initial case was 
overturned a few days later,
105
 the governments and the Indigenous parties signed the first 
modern treaty in 1977.
106
  Since then there have been about a dozen other treaties signed in 
British Columbia, the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Labrador, covering, in 
total, 40 percent of Canada’s lands, waters and resources.107  In other words, the Crown has 
embarked on a modern treaty-making exercise that, like the historic treaties, recognizes the 
existence of an Indigenous collectivity, recognizes their interest in their land, and recognizes the 
necessity of obtaining consent to access their territory.   
 
VIII. Concluding Thoughts 
 
Having argued for the adoption of the consent standard, I realize that these preliminary ideas 
cannot be implemented without a great deal of refinement. I will point out four important policy 
issues that need further consideration.  
 
First, the contemporary status of the land may have an impact on the implementation of the 
consent standard.  Unoccupied Crown land would be relatively straightforward to bring into the 
consent framework, but lands that have already been “taken up” for extractive industries, or 
lands that have already been alienated to third parties, would raise complicated discussions on 
the interests of non-Indigenous parties. 
 
Second, the precise circumstances which would trigger the necessity of consent would have to be 
worked out in the Canadian context. Opinion at the international level suggests that consent 
would not have to be sought on every decision that could affect Indigenous land interests. 
However, the articulation of what “significant” impact would attract the requirement for consent 
should be developed through the consideration of specific cases.  
 
Third, there would have to be some thought put into what “hunting, fishing and trapping” means 
in the context of the land as a source of livelihood today. Are these words to be read narrowly, to 
encompass only subsistence harvesting activities? In my 2001 article, I argued that the harvesting 
rights recognized in treaties should not be seen as rights of individual Indians, but rather as a 
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guarantee of collective survival.
 108 
That is, the Crown must ensure that there are sufficient 
resources on treaty lands to provide for the survival of the collective as a whole. Although the 
words in the treaty seem to be limited to individual rights to harvest from the land, a more 
historically accurate reading would see that the harvesting rights were a recognition that the 
Indigenous parties relied on the land for their economic survival. This economic survival 
approach is supported in the Supreme Court of Canada´s decision in R. v. Marshall.
109
 In this 
case Donald Marshall, a Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia was acquitted of fishing and selling eels 
without a license. The Court interpreted a 1760 treaty which did not mention fishing at all, but 
which had a clause providing for commercial relations between the British and the Mi’kmaq. As 
there was evidence that fish were traded at the time of the treaty, the Court found that the trading 
clause meant to protect “access to the things that were to be traded”. In other words, the Court 
took into account the larger economic context of the Indigenous relation to the land.  
 
Fourth, would the consent standard permit a First Nation to authorize hazardous activities, such 
as nuclear waste dump on its lands? In other words, does the ability to prevent deleterious 
activity also provide the Indigenous group an ability to authorize activity that would have a 
significant impact on its lands? I would say no, because the ability for the First Nation to 
authorize activities on its lands involves governance issues that are addressed in the self-
government and land claims agreements mentioned above.
110
  The consent standard does not 
itself address governance issues. It has been applied at the international level as a shield against 
detrimental extractive projects on Indigenous lands, not as a sword that can give authority to 
Indigenous groups. Both Delgamuukw and Xeni Gwet’in say that Indigenous people may not 
permit uses on their lands that would be inconsistent with the foundation of the Indigenous 
connection to the land and the interests of future generations. It seems to me, then, that in 
Canada, adopting the free, prior, informed consent will not open the way for unregulated 
deleterious uses of Indigenous lands.  
 
If there were treaty negotiations, these four questions would be an important part of the 
discussions. Absent such negotiations, the issues will be addressed in the courtroom. At the 
present time, courts in Canada are lagging behind international and private industry standards, as 
well as practice on the ground.  Rather than focusing on the fact that Indigenous parties do not 
have a veto, courts should focus on the development of the concept of consent. 
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